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Policy Research Working Paper 5824
This paper investigates the short-run consumption 
expenditure dynamics and the interaction of public and 
private arrangements of ultra-poor and labor-constrained 
households in Malawi using an original dataset from 
the Mchinjii social cash transfer pilot project (one of 
the first experiments of social protection policies based 
on unconditional cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa). 
The authors exploit the unique source of exogenous 
variation provided by the randomized component of the 
program in order to isolate the effect of cash transfers on 
consumption expenditures as well as the net crowding 
out effect of cash transfers on private arrangements. They 
find a statistically significant reduction effect on the 
level of consumption expenditures for those households 
receiving cash transfers, thus leading to the rejection of 
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the perfect risk sharing hypothesis. Moreover, by looking 
at the effects of cash transfers on private arrangements 
in a context characterized by imperfect enforceability of 
contracts and by a social fabric heavily compromised by 
high HIV/AIDS rates, the analysis confirms the presence 
of crowding out effects on private arrangements when 
looking at gifts and (to a lesser extent) remittances, while 
informal loans seem to be completely independent from 
the cash transfer’s reception. From a policy perspective, 
the paper offers a contribution to the evaluation of the 
very recent wave of social protection policies based on 
(unconditional) cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
suggesting that there might be an important role for 
public interventions aimed at helping households to pool 
risk more effectively.Cash Transfers in an Epidemic Context:                    
The Interaction of Formal and Informal Support 
in Rural Malawi 
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1.      Introduction 
 
The traditional informal system of safety nets and support based on family aid and communal 
living  has  eroded  in  many  Sub-Saharan  African  countries  where  poverty  and  AIDS  have 
destabilized households, orphaned children and changed demographic patterns (UNICEF, 2006). As 
a  consequence,  families  living  amid  widespread  poverty  in  AIDS-affected  communities  face  a 
social protection vacuum when both informal arrangements and formal interventions fail to provide 
the safety net that families need to survive (Miller, 2007). Over the last decade, social protection 
policy frameworks have gained increasing interest and support among governments and donors in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, social protection in the form of cash transfers is considered to be 
a critical component in fighting poverty and responding to families that have been overwhelmed by 
disease, illnesses, and other shocks (Barrientos and DeJong, 2004).  
Impact  evaluations  of  social  protection  programs  represent  a  fundamental  tool  for  policy 
formulation at the national level as well as for funding decisions from bilateral and multilateral 
donors.  However, such evaluations require a careful analysis of the interaction of a formal safety 
net with the informal insurance arrangements pre-existing in a particular context: in fact, in addition 
to direct effects, government interventions can also present indirect effects which might change the 
incentives to participate into private arrangements. Such indirect effects can be quite important, 
inducing crowding out of private insurance schemes, thus breaking down the fragile social fabric 
that maintains some form of social insurance among related individuals
2 (Albarran and Attanasio, 
2003). 
In this paper we focus on the specific context of Malawi, a country where the structure of the 
household and consequently the informal relationships are deeply affected  by the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic. Using a unique and  original dataset based  on a randomized design, we evaluate the 
effects of a public unconditional cash transfers program on consumption expenditures and whether 
this intervention actually weakens or reinforces an already fragile social fabric.  While there have 
been some studies of crowding out effects of social cash transfers programs in Latin America, very 
few studies have been done in  Sub-Saharan Africa and even fewer are based on a randomized 
experiment. Our results indicate that the impact on consumption expenditures for those households 
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receiving cash transfers, leading to the rejection of the perfect risk sharing hypothesis, while the 
presence of crowding out effects on private arrangements is confirmed for gifts and (to a lesser 
extent) remittances, but not for informal loans.  
The analysis is based on the Mchinji Social Cash Transfer Pilot Scheme
3, one of the first social 
protection experiments in Sub -Saharan Africa  and considered  to be  a major tool for poverty 
reduction in the Government of Malawi’s National Social Protection Policy. The Scheme covers 
more than 3,000 households living in rural villages in the Mchinjii area (central Malawi) and has the 
objective to alleviate poverty, reduce malnutrition and improve school enrolment among the poorest 
10% of households through regular and reliable cash transfers. From an econometric perspective, 
most of the studies of the crowding out effect suffer from important endogeneity problems due to 
the so-called “program placement effect” (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994)
4. In this paper we avoid 
such effect by exploiting the source of exogenous variation given by the randomized design of the 
dataset, which allows us to properly isolate the effect of cash transfers on the recipients’ welfare. 
We first assess the type of risk sharing arrangements (i.e. perfect, partial or autarchy) existing at 
village level by measuring the impact of unconditional cash transfers on households’ consumption 
expenditures,  controlling  for  aggregate  resources.  Then  we  assess  how  previously  existing 
arrangements based on private inter-household transfers are affected by the introduction of public 
transfers. To this aim, the dataset distinguishes between three different types of private transfers: 1) 
gifts (i.e. monetary or in-kind transfers without any repayment expectations attached), 2) loans (i.e. 
monetary  transfers  with  mandatory  repayment)  and  3)  remittances  (monetary  transfers  from 
household members living abroad), thus leading to a better understanding of how crowding out 
effects may differ according to the type of private transfer. 
The contribution of this paper to the academic and institutional debate on social protection 
policies is twofold: first, it suggests that there might be a role for public interventions aiming at 
helping households to pool risk more effectively as it shows that the perfect risk sharing hypothesis 
(once again) does not represent a proper description of the reality, even with reference to small 
village  economies  deeply  affected  by  the  HIV/AIDS  epidemic.  Second,  it  provides  empirical 
support to the analysis of the interaction of public programs and private transfers, showing how 
certain types of transfers (i.e. gifts and remittances) are more likely to be crowded out than others 
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(i.e. informal loans), thus providing useful insights for the proper design and implementation of 
social protection policies in a context characterized by imperfect enforceability of private insurance 
contracts and imperfect capital markets.           
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 further explores the literature and the theoretical 
framework; Section 3 presents the main features of the Mchinji cash transfer program; Section 4 
describes the data; Section 5 shows the econometric analysis and the results; Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.      Theoretical Framework 
In the present paper we combine the stream of economic research on consumption smoothing 
and perfect risk sharing in  small agricultural societies (village economies) with the one on the 
interaction of public and private insurance schemes.  
The first line of research, started by the seminal work of Townsend (1994) on Indian villages, 
focused on testing the perfect risk sharing hypothesis. Townsend showed that perfect insurance 
markets (i.e. markets which allow individuals to smooth idiosyncratic income shocks) are not a 
good description of the reality. Since his work, several other empirical works aimed at testing the 
perfect  risk  sharing  hypothesis  by  looking  at  whether  idiosyncratic  shocks  have  an  impact  on 
consumption growth.  They all have found evidence of partial risk sharing practices in several 
different contexts such as households in North Nigeria (Udry, 2004) or extended families in the US 
(Hayashi et al., 1996). Dercon and Khrisnan (2000) have further developed this type of research by 
looking at intra-household risk sharing practices in rural Ethiopia and end up rejecting the collective 
model  of  household  organization,  while  Grimard  (1997)  looked  directly  at  community  level 
mechanisms and investigates the hypothesis that households in Cote d'Ivoire take part in spatially 
diversified risk-sharing arrangements with members of their own ethnic group. Along these lines, 
Jayne et al. (2006) present a first attempt of quantitative research in this innovative area with a 
study  on  community-level  impacts  of  AIDS  related  mortality  in  Zambia.  By  using  a  set  of 
community level indicators (e.g. changes in area of cultivated land, crop output and per capita 
income),  they  examine  rural  community  resilience,  that  is  those  factors  explaining  why  some 
communities appear better than others to share the idiosyncratic shocks linked to AIDS related 
mortality despite similar adult mortality rates. Dercon and Krishnan (2003) use public transfers in 
the form of food aid to test for the presence of perfect risk sharing arrangements at the village level 5 
 
in rural Ethiopia. They end up rejecting the perfect risk sharing hypothesis in favor of partial risk 
sharing via transfers and they also address the issue of crowding out of informal insurance, thus 
bridging with the part of the academic literature that deals specifically with the investigation of the 
effects of public transfers on private arrangements. In fact, if, on one side, the rejection of the 
perfect risk sharing hypothesis suggests that there might be an important role for interventions 
aiming at helping households to pool risk more effectively (Morduch, 1999), on the other side, 
argues that such interventions do not occur in a vacuum but are the direct and indirect effects of 
certain government interventions that change the incentives to participate into private arrangements 
(Attanasio and Rios-Rull, 2000).                   
Studies  on  how  public  insurance  can  substitute  private  arrangements  have  been  done  with 
reference to both developed and developing countries: Cutler and Gruber (1996) on the expansion 
of Medicaid coverage and the reduction of private coverage; Cox et al. (1998) on the crowding out 
effect of social security benefits on private transfers in Perù; Jensen (2003) on a large increase in 
state old age pensions in South Africa showing that for each rand of public pension income to the 
elderly, there is a .25-.30 rand reduction in private transfers from children living away from home. 
In order to fully understand how public transfers affect private transfers it is then important to 
analyse what are the underlying motives for private transfers. In fact, different motives can have 
different implications as well as different channels of interaction for private and public transfers. In 
addition to altruistic or exchange motives, private transfers can also be just part of an insurance 
scheme where households are linked in order to share idiosyncratic risk, through either perfect or 
imperfect  risk  sharing  practices.  The  imperfections  that  prevent  risk  sharing  can  be  due  to 
asymmetric information or impossibility of enforcing contracts.  In the latter case individuals facing 
idiosyncratic risk can partly reduce it by entering contracts that are self-enforceable and there is a 
stream of theoretical literature dealing precisely with the issue of contract enforcement and limited 
commitment in risk sharing (Kocherlakota, 1996, Thomas and Worrall 1988, Dubois et al. 2007). 
As stated by Albarran and Attanasio (2003), models with imperfect enforceability explain small 
village economies, characterized by good information flows, repeated interactions and can replicate 
features of inter-households agreements. The main prediction of this type of model is that a welfare 
programme that involves public transfers to some or all partners of an insurance agreement with 
imperfect enforceability is likely to reduce private transfers. However, the amount by which private 
transfers are reduced is determined by features of the economy like the variance of income and its 
persistence. As contracts are self-enforcing, the amount of risk sharing depends on the value of 
autarchy (i.e. the state of an individual who does not engage in trading or contracts with anyone): 6 
 
whatever increases the value of autarchy, decreases risk sharing (e.g. decreasing the variance of 
income process or increasing the persistence of idiosyncratic shocks). Unconditional cash transfers, 
according  to  this  class  of  models,  induce  an  increase  in  the  value  of  autarky  which  implies  a 
reduction in risk sharing reflected by reduced private transfers. However, empirical evidence on 
models with imperfect enforceability is still limited: Foster and Rosenzweig (2001), Ligon et al. 
(2002) and Krueger and Perri (2006) consider different implications of imperfect enforceability and 
test them on data from Bangladesh, India and the US, respectively.  
The closest work to the type of analysis we carry out in the second part of the paper, is the one 
of  Albarran and  Attanasio  (2001)  where  the  two  authors  exploit  the  randomized  design  of  the 
PROGRESA dataset in Mexico and show the crowding out effect of the program on pre-existing 
private transfers that leads to an overall welfare decrease in the beneficiaries. In a subsequent work 
(Albarran and Attanasio, 2003), they focus on empirical implications of models with limited risk 
sharing due to imperfect enforceability of contracts and they show that the amount by which public 
transfers reduce private transfers is affected by features of the economy such as the variance of 
income at village level.                     
   
3.      The Institutional Framework 
The Government of Malawi defines social protection as “all public and private initiatives that 
provide income or consumption transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks 
and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalized, with the overall objective of reducing 
their economic and social vulnerability” (Government of Malawi, 2007).  
The International Labour Organization (ILO, 2001) distinguishes these initiatives into three 
main broad categories: social insurance (i.e. usually contributory and tax-funded schemes), labor 
market  regulation  (i.e.  legal  frameworks  aimed  at  ensuring  minimum  standards  of  working 
conditions) and social assistance (i.e. usually publicly funded and non contributory schemes aimed 
at addressing poverty and vulnerability). Social cash transfers are included in the latter category and 7 
 
can be defined as the “provision of assistance in the form of cash to the poor or those who face a 
probable risk, in the absence of the transfer, of falling into poverty” (Tabor, 2002)
5.     
3.1    The Context of Malawi 
Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 160 out of 188 countries in the 
2007 Human Development Index (UNDP 2007). Eighty-five percent of the population million lives 
in rural areas (entire population =14.2 million). As an agricultural society, most Malawians are 
dependent on smallholder farming and fishing. In 2008, gross domestic product (GDP) was USD 
800 per capita, with the percentage share of household income in the poorest 10% of households at 
2.9% compared to 32% in the wealthiest 10%.  According to the World Bank's Malawi Social 
Protection  Status  Report  (2007)  the  national  poverty  line  of  Malawi  is  set  at  MK16,165/year 
corresponding to MK44.3 or USD 0.50 per person per day, significantly below the standard USD l 
per day per person. The average poor household subsists on an income of around MK36.4 - 17.8 
percent below the MK44.3 daily poverty line while the ultra poor subsist on MK26.40, on average. 
According to the 2005 Malawian Integrated Household Survey (IHS), 52% of households fall 
below the poverty line, and of these, 22% fall below the ultra poverty line, so that approximately 7 
million people living in an estimated 1.3 million households are absolutely poor and 3 million 
people living in 550,000 households are ultra poor (NSO 2005).     
Vulnerability is defined as inability of households to deal with shocks to their livelihoods. 
Rising vulnerability implies both an increasing likelihood of shocks taking place and a declining 
ability  to  overcome  shocks  without  experiencing  livelihood  collapse.  Vulnerabilities  affecting 
Malawi include (Malawi Government, 2007): 
  agricultural  vulnerability  (i.e.  erratic  rainfall,  land  constraints,  lack  of  livestock  and 
constrained access to fertilizers, inputs and credit); 
  economic  shocks  and  processes  (undiversified  livelihoods,  weak  markets,  interactions 
between transitory shocks and chronic poverty); 
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  health and nutrition risks (high incidence of diarrhoea, acute respiratory infection, cholera 
and malaria) and HIV/AIDS; 
  demographic  vulnerability  (high  population  growth,  increasing  numbers  of  households 
headed by women, children or the elderly). 
 
3.2    The Mchinji Social Cash Transfer Program 
The Malawi Social Cash Transfer Scheme represents one of the key elements of the Malawi 
Growth and Development Strategy, a nationally owned strategy for investing in both economic 
growth and development (Government of Malawi 2006). The overall goal of the Cash Transfer 
Scheme is to protect and promote the livelihoods and welfare of the poorest and most vulnerable 
people: in particular, it has been designed to reach 10% of all households. Recipient households 
must meet the criteria of being ultra poor and labor constrained (Miller, Tsoka, Reichert 2010a). 
Ultra poor households are those living below the ultra poverty line and in the lowest expenditure 
quintile. They may only consume one meal per day and lack any valuable assets. Labor constrained 
households are those with no able bodied member between 19-64 who is fit for work or when one 
able  bodied  adult  must  care  for  more  than  3  dependents  (i.e.  children,  elderly,  chronically  ill 
persons).       
The Social Cash Transfer Scheme was launched in 2007 and by February 2009 was operational 
in  7  out  of the  country’s  28  districts,  distributing  monthly  cash  transfers to  more  than  24,306 
households. If brought to scale, the SCT would cover more than 300,000 families or 10% of all 
households  and  cost  approximately  US$68  million  per  year  or  1.5%  of  GDP  (Government  of 
Malawi, 2009).  
The dataset used in this paper is from the Evaluation of the Mchinji Social Cash Transfer Pilot. 
The Center for Global Health and Development (CGHD) at Boston University School of Public 
Health in collaboration with the Centre for Social Research (CSR) from the University of Malawi 
conducted the external evaluation of the SCTS pilot in Mchinji district.       
By March 2007, approximately 29 village groups within four out of nine Traditional Authorities 
(TAs) in the district were included in the transfer scheme. Village groups contain multiple villages 
so that the combined number of households per village group is approximately 1,000. Among these, 
the poorest 10% of households (approximately 100 households) per village group were identified to 9 
 
receive the SCTS. However, not all village groups within the four TAs had been reached by the 
SCTS in March 2007, given that the scheme was scaling up through the district as time and human 
resources allowed. In February 2007 the District Assembly identified the next 8  village groups 
eligible  for  the  SCT  according  to  the  scale-up  plan.  At  that  time,  the  impact  evaluation  team 
randomly assigned 4 village groups to an “intervention” group and 4 to a “control” group. While the 
choice of the village groups to be assigned to treatment and control was random, the selection of 
beneficiaries  within  each  village  group  was  based  on  a  multi  participatory  community  based 
targeting, which enables local community volunteers to determine which households among them 
are the worst off and most vulnerable
6.   
The evaluation team followed both groups for one year until the comparison group of eligible 
households began to receive the transfer.   Baseline data were collected in March 2007, before 
households received the cash transfer according to the government's schedule for rolling out the 
scheme. The second follow-up was in August 2007 and the final round in Marc h 2008. The study 
included a longitudinal household survey, consisting of three rounds of collection with a panel of 
intervention and control households in cash transfer recipient and non-recipient village groups. 
The household survey, used in the three data collection rounds, was adapted from existing 
household surveys  used with similar  populations throughout  Malawi,  such  as the  Integrated 
Household Survey (IHS), Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) and the Multiple Indicator 
Cluster Survey (MICS). The household questionnaire documents basic health, demographic and 
economic conditions, including anthropometric measurements; food security (including the quality 
and quantity of meals, food diversity, and satisfaction with meals based); edu cational data; health, 
hygiene and health seeking behaviors; economic data; time use and adult and child care patterns; 
emotional wellbeing; mobility and migration; coping behaviors; and characteristics of the house and 
inhabitants. The household questionnaire was administered to the person registered to receive the 
cash transfer (Miller, Tsoka, Reichert 2010b). 
 
                                                           
6 The District Secretariat trained a Community Social Protection Committee (CSPC) to help implement the 
scheme. The CSPC made a list of ultra poor labor constrained households based on community knowledge 
and  the  local  Village  Headman  signs  on  this  list.  The  CSPC  then  visited  the  households  to  fill  out  an 
application for each household. Next, the CSPC ranked households and chose the 10% poorest. A community 
meeting  occurred  where  the  ranking  was  discussed.    Then  Village,  District,  and  National  Committees 
approved  the  list  of  eligible  households.  Once  fully  approved,  recipients  started  receiving  transfers  on  a 
monthly basis.  
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4.      The Data 
The data used in this analysis are from the baseline (March 2007) and final round (March 2008) 
of the impact evaluation of the Malawi Cash Transfer Scheme.  The latter, includes 767 households 
of which 374 had already started to receive the cash transfer at the time of the interview and 393 
had not yet received it. We refer to the first as “treatment” group and the second as “control” group 
in the remainder of the paper. The sample is restricted to those households headed by an adult, thus 
excluding  so-called  child-headed  household,  which  might  be  significantly  different  from  adult-
headed households and not directly comparable. The analytical sample used for the econometric 
analysis is therefore composed by 749 households (387 control and 362 treatment).  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. The statistics are grouped according to the following 
categories: asset ownership, shocks, social safety nets, annual consumption expenditures, private 
transfers,  household  characteristics  and  head  of  household’s  characteristics.    The  latter  two 
categories  show  that  the  intervention  and  comparison  households  were  not  demographically 
identical at baseline, as the community social protection committees appear to have prioritized 
elderly households in the comparison  village groups and households with more children in the 
intervention village groups. Still, as highlighted in Miller, Tsoka, Reichert (2010b), households 
were  statistically  the  same  in  terms  of  consumption  expenditures,  food  insecurity  and  asset 
ownership at baseline, thus confirming the robustness of the randomization. Table 1 indicates that, 
at  baseline,  the  average  household  size  was  4  members  per  household.  More  than  half  of  the 
households in the sample had orphans; 20% had members with some forms of disabilities; over 30% 
included chronically ill members; 64% were female headed and 56% were headed by over 65 years 
old heads (Miller, Tsoka, Reichert 2010c). Descriptive statistics in the final round show several 
statistically  significant  differences  between  treatment  and  control  groups.  For  instance,  asset 
ownership  (measured  as  the  number  of  furniture,  animals  and  agricultural  tools)  increased 
significantly  for  households  in  the  treatment  group.  Moreover  households  that  received  cash 
transfers are more likely to face a shock related to livestock stolen or died, and are less exposed to 
income shocks due to house damages. They had also significantly reduced access to social safety 
nets  based  on  free  food  distribution  or  agricultural  inputs  compared  to  control  households.  A 
relevant impact is observed on health-related variables: the self-reported index of poor health status 
for the head of the households decreases from 74% to 3% in the treatment group while it remains 
almost stable for the control. Similarly, the percentage of household heads who reported being sick 11 
 
for more than one month in the previous year was halved between the baseline and the final round, 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics at Baseline and at the Final Round 
  Notes: based on the sample of 749h (387 control and 362 treatment). "*" indicates significance level (at the 
*** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level) of t-test comparing treatment and control. Figures in bold highlight 
the most relevant changes occurred at the final round compared to baseline. 
 
variable (% of) control treatment full sample control treatment full sample
Assets' ownership
furnitures (bed, table, chairs) 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.1 *** 0.24 0.17
animals (chicken, goats, others) 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.11 *** 0.89 0.49
agricoltural tools (hoe, axe, sickle) 0.9 0.88 0.88 0.8 *** 0.96 0.89
Shocks (over the past 2 yrs)
lower yields due to drought/floods 0.43 *** 0.59 0.49 0.21 0.19 0.2
crop disease 0.26 0.30 0.28 0.11 ** 0.17 0.14
livestock stolen or died 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.08 *** 0.28 0.18
rise in price of food 0.53 0.57 0.55 0.48 *** 0.57 0.52
birth in hh in past 2 years 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01
theft 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.05
house damage 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.31 *** 0.18 0.25
Social safety nets
Free food distribution 0.34 0.30 0.32 0.20 *** 0.13 0.16
Agricoltural inputs (starter pack) 0.07 0.1 0.08 0.00 *** 0.03 0.02
Inputs subsidy program 0.40 *** 0.49 0.44 0.52 *** 0.66 0.59
Annual consumption expenditures per adult equivalent
Total consumption (mean) 3593.4 3944.7 3763.2 4361.2 *** 28247.8 15905.8
tot cons (median) 1648 1748 1681.2 2127.9 *** 23060.2 9207.8
Food consumption (mean) 2630.4 2798.9 2711.8 2695.3 *** 20111.2 11112.6
food cons (median) 547.3 751.1 630.3 511.5 *** 16156.3 4471.0
Private transfers
Gifts 0.32 * 0.37 0.34 0.35 *** 0.08 0.22
Remittances 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.05 *** 0.01 0.03
Loans (informal) 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.13
Head of household's characteristics
gender (female=1) 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.67 0.63 0.65
no education  0.63 *** 0.43 0.53 0.61 *** 0.47 0.54
age (mean) 63.8 ** 60.9 62.4 65.1 *** 61.4 63.3
over 65 0.61 *** 0.51 0.56 0.62 *** 0.50 0.57
poor health status (self reported) 0.77 0.74 0.75 0.67 *** 0.3 0.49
sick for more than 1 month 0.31 0.35 0.33 0.22 ** 0.17 0.2
married 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.25 * 0.3 0.27
single 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
widow 0.56 0.53 0.57 0.57 ** 0.51 0.54
divorced 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16
Household characteristics
presence of orphans 0.46 *** 0.59 0.52 0.43 *** 0.52 0.47
hhsize 3.5 *** 4.7 4.1 3.5 *** 4.5 4
hhchildren 2.05 *** 3.09 2.55 2 *** 2.8 2.4
persons living with HIV 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04
members with disabilities 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.14 0.12 0.13
chronically ill adults 0.31 0.35 0.33 0.24 * 0.20 0.22
nr of meals the day before 1.49 1.46 1.47 1.50 *** 2.4 1.9
Baseline Final Round13 
 
Finally the variables on annual real total consumption and food only consumption expenditures 
per  adult  equivalent  confirm  the  well  executed  randomized  design  at  baseline,  and  shows 
impressive  changes  in  the  final  round,  which  will  be  further  analyzed  in  the  multivariate 
econometric analysis in the next section. The same applies to the descriptive statistics on private 
transfers: these show significant changes in gifts and remittances between baseline and the final 
round that will be also part of the econometric analysis of the crowding out effect in the next 
section.  In order to perform the econometric analysis on consumption, the expenditure per adult 
equivalent was calculated to take into account the different size and composition of the households. 
For the analysis of private arrangements, we relied on respondents’ reports of transfers received by 
each household. In particular, under the section dedicated to the sources of income, respondents 
were asked about the sources of support and income that the household received in the 12 months 
preceding the interview. Respondents reported whether they received each of these income sources, 
and, if yes, the amount in local currency, the frequency and the periodicity in the past year. On the 
basis of this information, we focused on three specific sources of income and support which are 
most  likely  to  be  related to  the  concept  of  inter-household  private  transfers  and  arrangements: 
remittances from family members employed elsewhere; gifts from family/friend/other; loans from 
family/friend/other. These three sources are all defined at the household level and therefore the 
household is our unit of analysis. For each of these three categories, we built an indicator that takes 
value  one  if  a  household  has  received  the  transfer.  Moreover,  by  aggregating  the  information 
provided for these three transfers’ sources separately, we built an indicator for those households that 
have received at least one transfer in the past year, regardless of the type of transfer. 
 
5.      Econometric Analysis 
The econometric analysis is divided into two parts: the first aims at testing for the presence of 
perfect risk sharing arrangements at village level by estimating the impact of unconditional cash 
transfers on consumption. The second part aims at measuring the impact of cash transfers on pre-
existing private arrangements and consequently at assessing the presence and the level of crowding 
out effects of private insurance by public transfers.  
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5.1    Risk Sharing and Cash Transfers    
The premise underlying most of the standard tests in the risk sharing literature is to assess 
whether idiosyncratic shocks contain any information that could explain consumption growth. The 
perfect risk sharing hypothesis implies that such shocks will have no impact as their effects will be 
perfectly shared across the members of the community.    
In Section 3.2, it has been highlighted how the literature has rejected this hypothesis in a variety 
of contexts. Still it is interesting to investigate it in the context of rural Malawi, as its rejection 
would provide support for the introduction of social protection mechanisms helping households to 
pool risk more effectively. The dataset allowed us to construct the consumption variables for both 
round  1  (i.e.  baseline  round)  and  round  3  (final  round).  We  looked  at  two  specifications  of 
consumption: food consumption and total consumption. The food consumption variable has been 
constructed as the sum of the expenditures on more than 110 food items consumed at the household 
level over the week preceding the interview. In particular, the food items  were grouped in the 
following categories: cereals and grains, roots and tubers, pulses, vegetables, meat, fish and animal 
products, fruits, cooked food from vendors, milk and milk products, sugar, fats and oil, beverages, 
spices and miscellaneous (Miller, Tsoka, Reichert 2010b). The non-food consumption variable is 
the result of the sum of expenditures on more than 30 non-food items divided on the basis of one 
week, one month or one year recall. The one week recall category includes items like charcoal, 
cigarettes, matches, newspapers and public transports; the one month recall category includes a 
range of items from bar soap and other personal care products to light bulbs, bicycle and vehicle 
repair  services,  electricity  and  telephone  units;  the  one  year  recall  category  includes  carpets, 
mosquito  nets,  building  items,  insurance,  funeral  costs,  marriage  costs  and  gifts
7.  The  sample 
contains households of different sizes and c ompositions: so it is therefore important to adjust our 
consumption estimates for these differences  as we would introduce an important distortion in  the 
results otherwise (White and Masset, 2003). This leads to the concept of adult equivalence scales . 
Using OECD equivalence scales, we then calculated the expenditure per adult equivalent following 
the same approach used by White and Masset (2003), with the total number of adult equivalents per 
household i given by: 
                AEi  = ∑βj,i                            
                                                           
7 All consumption variables have been harmonized as annual variables. 15 
 
where βj,i   is the adult equivalent for individual j in household i. We use a single calorific 
equivalence scale based on OECD recommendations and we assign to each child in the age group 0-
18 years a value of β= 0.3 of an adult, and a value of β= 0.5 to each other adult in the household 
which is not head of the household.  Against this background, the total consumption variable to be 
used in the econometric specification is constructed as the sum of household food and non food 
consumption  scaled  by  equivalents.  Consumption  is  expressed  in  March  2007  prices  using  the 
annual inflation rate for rural areas provided by the Malawi Statistical Office.      
Quantile regression models were used to quantify outcomes at the median and at the .25 and .75 
quantile: this choice allows for a type of robust regression analysis which reduces the influence of 
outliers.  The  dependent  variable  used  in  the  analysis  is  given  by  the  ratio  of  the  variation  of 
consumption between the final round and the baseline round over the average total consumption 
measured at t0 and t1.  This is an alternative measure of consumption variation used in place of the 
more traditional difference in logarithmic consumption at t1 and t0. The econometric specification 
can be written as:  
               Δci = β0 + β1 Ti+ β2 Xi + β3Zi + εh                                                   (1) 
where the dependent variable, defined as [(c1-c0)/( c1+c0)]*2, is regressed on a constant and a set of 
taste shifters Zi like the household composition as well as age, sex, health and marital status of the 
head of the household. Moreover, a set of variables Xi measuring idiosyncratic shocks at household 
and village level affecting the level of income, such as crop pests, livestock stolen and price shocks, 
was used. The transfer T is also part of the regression. Under the perfect risk sharing hypothesis, the 
coefficients on idiosyncratic shocks and on the transfer should be equal to zero. If this is not the 
case, then it means that transfers and other shocks to income have an impact on the household’s 
level of consumption and therefore the perfect risk sharing hypothesis is ruled out. In fact while 
usually negative shocks are considered good candidates for testing the effect of idiosyncratic shocks 
to consumption, we use a positive shock in the form of an unconditional cash transfers given to 
some households in the village, as idiosyncratic shock. Positive shocks should in fact also be shared 




Table 2 – Quantile Regressions: Total Consumption Expenditures 
 
Notes: Significant at the *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Robust standard errors in squared brackets. 
Dependent variable: Ratio of the variation of consumption between t1 and t0 over total average consumption in t1 and t0 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
treated 1.391 *** 1.317 *** 2.207 *** 1.965 *** 0.698 *** 0.660 ***
[0.036] [0.074] [0.085] [0.076] [0.038] [0.040]
Village level shocks 
Lower yields due to drought or floods -0.004 -0.007 -0.130 -0.247 *** -0.015 0.000
[0.038] [0.075] [0.087] [0.078] [0.041] [0.040]
Rise in food prices -0.103 *** -0.111 -0.096 0.012 -0.023 -0.009
[0.038] [0.073] [0.087] [0.076] [0.041] [0.040]
HH level shocks 
Crop disease 0.030 0.012 0.063 0.063 0.017 0.044
[0.041] [0.079] [0.095] [0.082] [0.043] [0.043]
Livestock died or stolen -0.106 ** -0.046 0.025 -0.023 0.009 -0.008
[0.047] [0.091] [0.111] [0.096] [0.049] [0.048]
Theft -0.125 ** -0.119 -0.006 -0.051 0.003 -0.026
[0.063] [0.122] [0.148] [0.131] [0.068] [0.066]
House damage -0.079 ** -0.105 -0.183 ** -0.198 *** -0.043 -0.041
[0.037] [0.072] [0.087] [0.076] [0.040] [0.038]
Safety net (food) 0.029 0.005 -0.102 -0.165 ** -0.012 -0.014
[0.039] [0.076] [0.092] [0.082] [0.041] [0.040]
Safety net (agr. inputs) -0.273 *** -0.226 *** -0.228 *** -0.170 ** -0.120 *** -0.107 ***
[0.037] [0.075] [0.087] [0.080] [0.039] [0.040]
HH assets
Furnitures (mattress, table, chairs) 0.101 0.258 ** 0.009
[0.128] [0.129] [0.068]
Animal (chickens, pigs, etc) -0.022 0.119 -0.065
[0.108] [0.113] [0.059]
Agr tools (axe, sickle, hoe) -0.193 * -0.283 ** -0.059
[0.115] [0.123] [0.061]
HH characteristics
HH size 0.023 0.016 0.004
[0.021] [0.025] [0.011]
Chronically ill adults 0.087 0.199 ** 0.054
[0.077] [0.082] [0.041]
Presence of orphans -0.015 -0.110 0.009
[0.083] [0.087] [0.045]
Deaths in the past 5 years -0.012 0.193 ** -0.004
[0.078] [0.082] [0.040]
Disable persons 0.040 0.037 0.071
[0.087] [0.093] [0.045]
Head of HH's charact.
Female headed 0.030 0.310 ** 0.035
[0.116] [0.127] [0.060]
Over 65 yrs old -0.044 -0.097 0.001
[0.083] [0.086] [0.044]
No education 0.004 -0.076 -0.005
[0.074] [0.079] [0.039]
Poor health status in the past year 0.118 0.317 *** 0.016
[0.090] [0.092] [0.049]
Employment in past year -0.093 -0.193 ** -0.053
[0.097] [0.103] [0.051]
Married -0.029 -0.435 * 0.032
[0.252] [0.263] [0.134]
Divorced -0.054 -0.588 ** 0.021
[0.260] [0.275] [0.138]
Widow -0.106 -0.671 ** 0.015
[0.252] [0.270] [0.135]
Constant 0.496 *** 0.573 ** -0.598 *** -0.119 1.248 *** 1.218 ***
[0.042] [0.277] [0.101] [0.289] [0.044] [0.142]
Nr. of obs. 749 744 749 744 749 744
R-sq 0.23 0.25 0.31 0.34 0.13 0.14
Median .25 quantile .75 quantile17 
 
The  design  of  the  dataset,  based  on  perfect  randomization,  allows  ruling  out  the  risk  of 
distortions due to the so-called “program placement effect”.   Table  2  summarizes  the 
econometric  results  for  total  consumption  while  Table  3  shows  the  results  for  food-only 
consumption. Two specifications are presented for each of the three quantile regressions. The first 
specifications controls only for village and household level shocks, while the second specification 
includes the whole set of controls (i.e. adding to the previous also household’s assets, household’s 
characteristics, and head of household’s characteristics).   
The results across all specifications for the coefficient on the variable of interest (indicating the 
reception of cash transfer) confirm the rejection of the hypothesis of perfect risk sharing, as in all 
cases, controlling for village level aggregate resources, the consumption levels are clearly affected 
by the (positive) idiosyncratic shock represented by cash transfers.        
More  specifically,  Table  2  shows  the  impact  of  cash  transfers  on  total  consumption.  It  is 
interesting to note how the coefficient of “treated” varies according to the quantile regression. The 
coefficient in fact should be interpreted as the difference in median (or in the .25 or .75 quantile 
accordingly) of the variation of consumption in t1 and t0 between the treatment and the control 
group.  So  while  across  all  groups  the  increase  in  the  variation  of  consumption  is  statistically 
significant at the 1% level across all specifications, it is worth noting that those households in the 
.25 quantile of the distribution, meaning those household whose consumption would have varied the 
less in the absence of the cash transfers, are precisely those taking more advantage of the transfer by 
increasing their variation of consumption by a coefficient of 1.96.      
On the other side, those households in the .75 quantile of the distribution, represent those who 
would  have increased their  consumption in  any  case,  so their  variation  of consumption is  still 
significant, but it increases less (the coefficient is equal to 0.66) compared to those in the median or 
in the .25 quantile of the distribution.    
A similar trend is observable in Table 3 concerning the food-only consumption.      
Regarding the significance of control variables, Table 2 shows that the presence of a social 
safety  net  based  on  agricultural  inputs  has  a  negative  effect  on  the  variation  of  consumption 
expenditures across the whole distribution (median, .25 and .75 quantile), probably explained by the 
fact that households who receive agricultural inputs are then able to cultivate and consume their 
own products, thus reducing consumption expenditures.  Only those in the .25 quantile register a 
statistically significant reduction in their increase of consumption expenditures due to the presence 
of shocks like house damages, lower crop yields due to drought or floods and the presence of safety 
nets based on the distribution of free food.   Moreover,  while  the  remaining  categories  of 18 
 
covariates used as controls are not statistically significant for those in the median and those in the 
.75  quantile  of  the  distribution  (with  the  only  exception  of  agricultural  tools  for  those  in  the 
median), this does not apply to households in the .25 quantile, whose consumption expenditures are 
then influenced by household’s characteristics (e.g. presence of chronically ill adults or deaths in 
the family in the past 5 years) as well as by head of household’s characteristics (e.g. female headed 
households have a positive impact on consumption while single heads of households increase their 
consumption more compared to married, divorced and widows).        Similarly 
for the food  only  consumption  covariates (Table  3),  the full  control specifications  confirm  the 
impact of safety nets consisting of agricultural inputs, while village level shocks, like a rise in the 
prices of food, have a negative impact on households in the median of the distribution. An increase 
in household’s assets does not have any effect on the variation of consumption for those households 
in the .75 quantile of the distribution, while it seems to affect those in the median and those in the 
.25 quantile. In fact, for the former it is an increase in the number of animals that have a positive 
“wealth  effect”  on  consumption  expenditures,  while  for  the  latter  the  increase  in  furniture 
ownership has a positive effect and the increase in the number of agricultural tools available has a 
negative impact. Female headed households seem to have a statistically significant and positive 
impact on the variation of consumption only for those in the .25 quantile and in the median, while it 
is not significant for those living in the .75 quantile. The same applies to the condition of widows 
but with a negative impact on the variation of consumption. Finally, a counterintuitive result is 
given by the negative impact of employment in the past year across all specifications. A possible 
explanation could be that, given the rural environment, many temporary and irregular jobs are 
related to cultivation and the payment can be in kind instead of monetary. In this hypothesis then, 
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Table 3 – Quantile Regressions: Food Consumption Expenditures 
 Notes: Significant at the *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Robust standard errors in squared brackets. 
Dependent variable: Ratio of the variation of food cons. between t1 and t0 over total average food cons. in t1 and t0 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
treated 1.710 *** 1.694 *** 2.587 *** 2.333 *** 0.691 *** 0.677 ***
[0.056] [0.048] [0.112] [0.087] [0.020] [0.029]
Village level shocks 
Lower yields due to drought or floods -0.089 -0.101 ** -0.046 -0.190 ** 0.005 0.019
[0.059] [0.049] [0.117] [0.088] [0.022] [0.029]
Rise in food prices -0.117 ** -0.113 ** -0.232 ** -0.028 -0.032 -0.046
[0.058] [0.048] [0.117] [0.087] [0.021] [0.029]
HH level shocks 
Crop disease 0.048 0.031 0.130 0.101 0.005 0.052 *
[0.063] [0.052] [0.126] [0.091] [0.022] [0.031]
Livestock died or stolen -0.007 0.029 0.050 -0.010 -0.005 -0.007
[0.072] [0.060] [0.148] [0.106] [0.025] [0.035]
Theft 0.019 0.006 -0.216 -0.130 -0.003 -0.029
[0.098] [0.080] [0.193] [0.146] [0.035] [0.049]
House damage -0.086 -0.036 -0.225 ** -0.139 -0.021 -0.029
[0.058] [0.047] [0.116] [0.086] [0.021] [0.028]
Safety net (food) 0.020 0.029 -0.054 -0.005 0.009 0.006
[0.061] [0.050] [0.122] [0.090] [0.021] [0.029]
Safety net (agr. inputs) -0.118 ** -0.126 ** -0.181 -0.156 * -0.040 ** -0.025
[0.058] [0.049] [0.115] [0.088] [0.020] [0.028]
HH assets
Furnitures (mattress, table, chairs) 0.060 0.446 *** 0.074
[0.084] [0.146] [0.050]
Animal (chickens, pigs, etc) 0.183 ** 0.065 0.007
[0.072] [0.125] [0.041]
Agr tools (axe, sickle, hoe) -0.045 -0.363 *** -0.008
[0.073] [0.140] [0.045]
HH characteristics
HH size 0.006 0.032 -0.002
[0.014] [0.025] [0.008]
Chronically ill adults 0.129 ** 0.301 *** 0.044
[0.051] [0.092] [0.030]
Presence of orphans -0.022 -0.216 ** 0.004
[0.055] [0.092] [0.033]
Deaths in the past 5 years 0.040 0.218 ** 0.003
[0.051] [0.092] [0.030]
Disable persons 0.085 0.062 0.042
[0.057] [0.104] [0.034]
Head of HH's charact.
Female headed 0.152 ** 0.320 ** 0.068
[0.077] [0.136] [0.048]
Over 65 yrs old -0.048 -0.179 * -0.052 *
[0.054] [0.094] [0.032]
No education 0.020 -0.062 0.013
[0.048] [0.088] [0.029]
Poor health status in the past year 0.012 0.354 *** 0.014
[0.059] [0.102] [0.035]
Employment in past year -0.164 ** -0.241 ** -0.108 ***
[0.064] [0.114] [0.038]
Married -0.056 -0.704 ** 0.160
[0.163] [0.292] [0.100]
Divorced -0.258 -0.912 *** 0.119
[0.172] [0.306] [0.104]
Widow -0.280 * -1.004 *** 0.098
[0.166] [0.299] [0.101]
Constant 0.199 0.237 -1.060 *** -0.373 1.290 *** 1.115 ***
[0.065] [0.180] [0.134] [0.323] [0.022] [0.104]
Nr. of obs. 749 744 749 744 749 744
R-sq 0.23 0.25 0.3 0.33 0.09 0.1
Median .25 quantile .75 quantile20 
 
5.2    Crowding out of Private Arrangements    
Next, Probit models have been used to measure the impact of the social cash transfer on the 
probability of receiving private transfers. The presence of crowding out effects has been tested by 
using a structure of controls similar to the one used for testing consumption smoothing and includes 
aggregate shocks at village level, idiosyncratic shocks at household level, the presence of other 
externally provided safety nets, household characteristics and also demographic characteristics of 
the  heads  of  household  (i.e.  age,  gender,  education  level,  health  status  and  marital  status  and 
employment  in  the  past  year).  We  first looked  at the  crowding  out  effects  of  private transfers 
without making distinctions based on the type of transfers. Secondly, the same methodology has 
been  applied  on  the  probability  for  a  household  of  receiving  a  transfer  distinguishing  between 
remittances, gifts and loans.                The  randomized 
design of the dataset allows us to isolate the effect of the public transfers by comparing treatment 
and control households and checking whether treatment households receive less frequent transfers 
than  control  households.  Moreover  the  distinction  between  remittances,  gifts  and  loans  allows 
enriching the analysis with considerations linked to the geographical proximity (e.g. by comparing 
remittances  from  elsewhere  and  gifts  from  family  or  friends  living  closer  to  the  reference 
household).             The  results  for  the  average  marginal 
effects based on Probit models are reported in Tables 4 to 7.  Table 4 refers to any transfer. The 
control structure is progressively adding categories of control variables in each specification. It is 
interesting to note that the crowding out effect (i.e. a reduction of 24% in probability) of cash 
transfers (CT) on any private transfer is consistently significant across all specifications at 1% level. 
As shown in the next tables, the effects of gifts are likely to be dominant in the dependent variable 
used in Table 4, which aggregates the three different types of transfers. Moreover, the covariates 
included in the control structure show that an increase in assets (animals or agricultural tools) can 
reduce by 10 to 13% the probability of receiving private transfers, while the presence of disabled 
members in the household or the shock given by a theft in the past year can increase the probability 
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Notes: Table reports estimated marginal effects after probit.Significant at the *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 
10% level. Robust standard errors in squared brackets. 
Dependent variable =  1 if the household received a private transfer in the last 12 months
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
treated -0.245 *** -0.246 *** -0.247*** -0.251 *** -0.238*** -0.242 ***
[0.033] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.035] [0.036]
Village level shocks 
Lower yields due to drought or floods 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.019 0.006
[0.037] [0.037] [0.038] [0.038] [0.039]
Rise in food prices -0.032 -0.025 -0.017 -0.001 0.000
[0.036] [0.037] [0.037] [0.038] [0.038]
HH level shocks 
Crop disease 0.031 0.041 0.058 0.060
[0.040] [0.041] [0.041] [0.042]
Livestock died or stolen -0.079 * -0.066 -0.063 -0.058
[0.043] [0.044] [0.045] [0.045]
Theft 0.100 0.104 * 0.097 * 0.101 *
[0.065] [0.065] [0.066] [0.067]
House damage 0.012 0.009 0.006 0.004
[0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037]
Safety net (food) 0.033 0.029 0.013 0.006
[0.038] [0.038] [0.039] [0.039]
Safety net (agr. inputs) -0.022 -0.004 0.013 0.001
[0.036] [0.036] [0.038] [0.039]
HH assets
Furnitures (mattress, table, chairs) -0.001 -0.010 -0.026
[0.063] [0.063] [0.064]
Animal (chickens, pigs, etc) -0.100 * -0.091 * -0.103 *
[0.052] [0.053] [0.053]
Agr tools (axe, sickle, hoe) -0.144 *** -0.135 ** -0.138 **
[0.060] [0.061] [0.063]
HH characteristics
HH size -0.012 -0.008
[0.009] [0.011]
Chronically ill adults -0.008 -0.026
[0.038] [0.039]
Presence of orphans -0.040 -0.040
[0.040] [0.042]
Deaths in the past 5 years 0.026 0.027
[0.040] [0.041]
Disable persons 0.080 * 0.082 *
[0.046] [0.046]
Head of HH's charact.
Female headed -0.018
[0.042]




Poor health status in the past year 0.058
[0.045]
Employment in past year 0.040
[0.051]
Nr. of obs. 749 749 749 749 748 744
R-sq 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.0922 
 
Given the detailed information collected, it is useful to look at the different types of transfers 
separately in order to be able to isolate the net effect of cash transfers (Tables 5 to 7). Table 5 refers 
to remittances only. Here there is a small crowding out effect on private transfers due to the cash 
transfer (a reduction of 1.5% in the probability of receiving remittances for those households that 
receive CT). Remittances come from members of the household living abroad, either within or 
outside the country. The econometric analysis indicates that these have a compensation function 
with respect to shocks occurring at household level as when livestock die or is stolen implying a 2% 
increase in the probability of receiving a remittance. The presence of orphans in the household 
reduces the probability of receiving remittances by 1 percentage point, which may be explained by 
the fact that the orphan status of children implies a lower probability of family members surviving 
and working abroad. Moreover, the age of the household head also plays an important role: the 
older the household head, the higher the probability of receiving a remittance, thus confirming the 
role  of  informal  “social  security”  that  private  transfer  plays  especially  in  developing  countries 
where formal social security schemes are in most of the cases absent. Finally, an increase in the 
number  of  agricultural  tools  implies  a  decrease  in  the  probability  of  receiving  remittances,  as 
agricultural tools can be interpreted as an instrument for wealth.  Table 6 refers to gifts from family 
and friends. Here the crowding out effect on private transfer is strong and persistent with a 24% 
reduction in the probability of receiving private gifts for those households who receive the CT. 
Contrary to the case of remittances, here the loss of livestock implies a reduction of 6% in the 
probability of receiving a transfer. This difference might be explained by the fact that livestock 
ownership is somewhat rare. People who bought livestock rose above their neighbors so that losing 
livestock was not seen as dire. Therefore its loss implies a reduction in the inter-household level of 
transfers, while for a family member living abroad and whose income is not linked to livestock, a 
similar loss implies an increase in the probability of making a transfer. Here as well, an increase in 
the household’s assets and particularly in agricultural tools indicates an increase in wealth and 
therefore implies a 10% reduction in the probability of receiving gifts. On the contrary the presence 
of disabled members is associated with a 9% increase in probability of receiving gifts. The fact that 
the crowding out effect is much stronger than in the case of remittances is in line with the idea that 
people  living  in  the  village  or  nearby  have  better  information  on  the  nature  of  the  grant  and 
therefore can react more to its introduction. This can also be read as a positive element, meaning 
that the flow of money in the village from members living outside is only marginally affected by the 
introduction of the cash transfer scheme and consequently it is possible to argue that the overall 
level of wealth in the village increases. 23 
 
Table 5 – Marginal effects after Probit - Remittances 
Notes: Table reports estimated marginal effects after probit.Significant at the *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 
10% level. Robust standard errors in squared brackets. 
Dependent variable =  1 if the household received a remittance in the last 12 months
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
treated -0.033 *** -0.030 ** -0.027 ** -0.028 ** -0.023 ** -0.015 ***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.007]
Village level shocks 
Lower yields due to drought or floods -0.012 -0.013 -0.011 -0.010 -0.007 **
[0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.009] [0.005]
Rise in food prices -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000
[0.012] [0.011] [0.010] [0.009] [0.004]
HH level shocks 
Crop disease -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.004]
Livestock died or stolen 0.032 ** 0.031 ** 0.029 ** 0.020 ***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.017] [0.012]
Theft 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.011
[0.023] [0.023] [0.022] [0.013]
House damage -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001
[0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.004]
Safety net (food) 0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.001
[0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.004]
Safety net (agr. inputs) 0.012 0.014 0.011 0.004
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.005]
HH assets
Furnitures (mattress, table, chairs) -0.007 -0.007 -0.004
[0.013] [0.011] [0.003]
Animal (chickens, pigs, etc) 0.007 0.006 0.002
[0.017] [0.015] [0.006]
Agr tools (axe, sickle, hoe) -0.035 * -0.036 ** -0.023 **
[0.026] [0.026] [0.018]
HH characteristics
HH size 0.001 0.001
[0.002] [0.001]
Chronically ill adults -0.005 -0.003
[0.009] [0.003]
Presence of orphans -0.024 ** -0.011 **
[0.012] [0.007]
Deaths in the past 5 years 0.012 0.007
[0.012] [0.007]
Disable persons -0.014 -0.005
[0.008] [0.004]
Head of HH's charact.
Female headed -0.003
[0.004]
Over 65 yrs old 0.024 ***
[0.009]
No education -0.013 ***
[0.007]
Poor health status in the past year -0.005
[0.007]
Employment in past year 0.003
[0.006]
Nr. of obs. 749 749 749 749 748 744
R-sq 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.1 0.14 0.2724 
 
Table 6 – Marginal effects after Probit - Gifts 
Notes: Table reports estimated marginal effects after probit.Significant at the *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 
10% level. Robust standard errors in squared brackets. 
Dependent variable =  1 if the household received a gift in the last 12 months
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
treated -0.26 *** -0.258 *** -0.257 *** -0.259 *** -0.240 *** -0.239 ***
[0.028] [0.029] [0.029] [0.034] [0.030] [0.030]
Village level shocks 
Lower yields due to drought or floods 0.020 0.030 0.028 0.026 0.022
[0.031] [0.031] [0.038] [0.031] [0.032]
Rise in food prices -0.076 * -0.073 * -0.066 ** -0.046 -0.045
[0.031] [0.031] [0.037] [0.031] [0.031]
HH level shocks 
Crop disease -0.024 -0.016 0.004 0.005
[0.033] [0.041] [0.034] [0.035]
Livestock died or stolen -0.076 ** -0.069 * -0.064 * -0.058 *
[0.033] [0.044] [0.034] [0.035]
Theft -0.007 -0.003 -0.012 -0.013
[0.051] [0.065] [0.050] [0.050]
House damage -0.007 -0.009 -0.010 -0.013
[0.031] [0.037] [0.030] [0.030]
Safety net (food) 0.048 0.046 0.024 0.023
[0.033] 0.038] [0.033] [0.033]
Safety net (agr. inputs) -0.013 0.000 0.022 0.016
[0.030] [0.037] [0.032] [0.032]
HH assets
Furnitures (mattress, table, chairs) 0.005 -0.009 -0.022
[0.063] [0.051] [0.051]
Animal (chickens, pigs, etc) -0.071 -0.056 -0.069
0.0517 [0.043] [0.042]
Agr tools (axe, sickle, hoe) -0.113 ** -0.096 ** -0.105 **
[0.060] [0.054] [0.056]
HH characteristics
HH size -0.018 ** -0.013
[0.008] [0.009]
Chronically ill adults 0.010 0.002
[0.031] [0.033]
Presence of orphans -0.017 -0.019
[0.034] [0.035]
Deaths in the past 5 years 0.026 -0.004
[0.033] [0.034]
Disable persons -0.011 ** 0.088 **
[0.040] [0.041]
Head of HH's charact.
Female headed -0.021
[0.035]




Poor health status in the past year 0.007
[0.039]
Employment in past year -0.027
[0.041]
Nr. of obs. 749 749 749 749 748 744
R-sq 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.1525 
 
Finally, Table 7 focuses on loans. It is interesting to note that there is no crowding out effect 
when we look at loans from other family members and friends. In this case the reception of the 
public cash transfer seems to not have any significant impact on the probability of receiving a loan 
from family or friends. On the contrary, an explanatory variable for informal loans showing a strong 
statistical significance is a dummy indicating whether the household had already been borrowing 
money in the past (i.e. before the start of the program). In fact, those households who were already 
borrowing money have a 20% increase in the probability of receiving a loan which is independent 
of their cash transfer recipient status. This highlights an interesting mechanism of the functioning of 
informal  rural  credit  markets,  where  the  reputation  of  the  borrower  built  through  repeated 
interactions can often play a crucial role, comparable to collateral. Moreover, by looking at the rest 
of covariates in the regression model, the probability of receiving a loan seems to be also influenced 
by shocks and head of household’s characteristics: for instance, having an agricultural output shock 
(e.g. a crop disease), increases the probability of receiving a loan by 6%, while being an older head 
of household reduces the probability of receiving a loan by 6%.  Against  this  background  a 
question remains open about whether the crowding out observed for gifts should be interpreted as a 
negative side-effect of the intervention and therefore requires a correction in the program design or, 
on  the  contrary,  it  could  be  seen  as  a  signal  that  resources  are  re-allocated  within  the  village 
economy  and  directed  to  other  needy  recipients.  Additional  information  provided  by  the 
questionnaire tells us that 9% of cash transfer beneficiaries share the received cash with neighbors 
or  others  outside  the  household,  14%  regularly  share  food  bought  with  the  cash  transfer  with 
neighbors or others, while 23% have started a business with funds from the cash transfer (Miller 
2011). This piece of information, coupled with the result on remittances which shows that the 
crowding out effect on this type of transfer is extremely small, seems to suggest that the amount of 
additional resources generated by the cash transfer can be used for a better re-allocation of resources 







Table 7 – Marginal effects after Probit - Loans 
 
Notes: Table reports estimated marginal effects after probit. Significant at the *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 
10% level. Robust standard errors in squared brackets. 
Dependent variable =  1 if the household received a loan in the last 12 months
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
treated 0.0086 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.007
[0.024] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024] [0.028] [0.028]
Village level shocks 
Lower yields due to drought or floods 0.022 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.004
[0.025] [0.026] [0.026] [0.025] [0.025]
Rise in food prices 0.035 0.038 0.038 0.028 0.023
[0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]
HH level shocks 
Crop disease 0.061 ** 0.061 ** 0.059 ** 0.064 **
[0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030]
Livestock died or stolen -0.028 -0.025 -0.025 -0.026
[0.029] [0.030] [0.028] [0.028]
Theft 0.082 * 0.081 * 0.062 0.068
[0.052] [0.052] [0.049] [0.049]
House damage 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002
[0.025] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024]
Safety net (food) -0.029 -0.029 -0.026 -0.028
[0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]
Safety net (agr. inputs) -0.004 -0.002 -0.020 -0.025
[0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]
HH assets
Furnitures (mattress, table, chairs) -0.002 -0.002 -0.009
[0.043] [0.043] [0.042]
Animal (chickens, pigs, etc) -0.026 -0.027 -0.031
[0.034] [0.033] [0.033]
Agr tools (axe, sickle, hoe) 0.012 0.004 0.008
[0.038] [0.039] [0.037]
HH characteristics
HH size 0.005 0.005
[0.006] [0.007]
Chronically ill adults 0.020 0.004
[0.026] [0.026]
Presence of orphans 0.019 0.010
[0.027] [0.027]
Deaths in the past 5 years 0.000 0.000
[0.026] [0.026]
Disable persons 0.003 0.007
[0.030] [0.030]




Head of HH's charact.
Female headed 0.018
[0.027]




Poor health status in the past year 0.062 **
[0.024]
Employment in past year 0.009
[0.032]
Nr. of obs. 749 749 749 749 748 744
R-sq 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.0827 
 
6.    Conclusions 
In this paper we explore the short-run consumption expenditure dynamics and the interaction of 
public and private arrangements using a randomized sample of 749 rural households in Malawi. The 
context  of  rural Malawi  represents  an  extremely  interesting  setting  due  to the  high  HIV/AIDS 
prevalence that has inevitably shaped the social structure of many households. Moreover, the cash 
transfer pilot project used in the analysis represents one of the first experiments of social protection 
policies based on unconditional cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa.  We exploit the unique source 
of exogenous variation provided by the randomized component of the program in order to isolate 
the effect of cash transfers on consumption expenditures as well as the net crowding out effect of 
cash transfers on private arrangements.     We find a large effect in the level of variation of 
consumption expenditures for those households receiving the cash transfer. The effect is statistically 
significant across all specifications. The magnitude of the coefficient varies on the basis of the 
distribution’s  quantile,  showing  that  households  in  the  .25  quantile  of  the  variation  of 
consumption’s distribution (i.e. those households that, in the absence of the cash transfer, would 
have shown a smaller variation in consumption expenditures) are those who register the highest 
increase  in  their  consumption  expenditures,  while  households in the .75  quantile increase  their 
expenditures less (as they would have probably increased it in any case). These findings confirm the 
rejection of the perfect risk sharing hypothesis and suggest that there might be an important role for 
public interventions that might help households to pool risk more effectively. Consequently, the 
government’s initiative of implementing a public cash transfer program seems to be well justified 
by the type of risk sharing arrangements and market imperfections existing at the village level.    
However,  in  order  to  test  how  such  public  interventions  interact  with  pre-existing  private 
arrangements at village level we have also looked at the effects of cash transfers on private transfers 
in  a  context  where  the  social  fabric  is  already  heavily  compromised  by  the  presence  of  high 
HIV/AIDS rates, and characterized by imperfect enforceability of contracts.    
On the basis of the detailed information provided in the dataset, we could distinguish among 
three different types of private transfers: remittances, informal loans from friends or other family 
members and gifts from friends or other family members without the expectation of repayment. 
Results confirm the presence of crowding out effects on private arrangements when looking at gifts 
and, to a lesser extent, remittances, while informal loans seem to be completely independent from 
the cash transfer’s reception. The fact that the crowding out effect is much stronger in the case of 28 
 
gifts than in the case of remittances is in line with the idea that people living in the village, or near-
by,  have  better  information  on  the  nature  of  the  grant  and  therefore  can  react  more  to  its 
introduction.  The  control  structure  used  in  the  analysis,  checking  for  shocks  at  household  and 
village  level  as  well  as  for  household’s  specific  characteristics,  confirm  the  robustness  of  the 
findings which are not an artifact of shocks or demographic features. Finally, the result concerning 
informal loans that depend on pre-existing credit transactions rather than on the public cash transfer 
highlights an interesting feature of the functioning of informal rural credit markets which should be 
further explored in future research on the basis of additional data collection.    
From a policy perspective, the present paper offers a contribution to the evaluation of the very 
recent wave of social protection policies based on (unconditional) cash transfers in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, on one side by showing that similar policies may be well motivated on the basis of the 
imperfect  risk  sharing  arrangements  existing  at  the  village  level  and,  on  the  other  side,  by 
highlighting  the  importance  of  taking  into  account  the  interactions  of  these  policies  with  pre-
existing private arrangements. 
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